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In 2002 the Supreme Court was con-
fronted by a case that questioned the 
validity of a marriage that had already 
been dissolved through divorce.2 The 
claim was raised through doubts about 
the legitimacy of a divorce dissolved 
at a Sharia court in a Muslim-majority 
country prior to a marriage contracted 
in a Norwegian mosque. Muslims in Nor-
way have the right to solemnize mar-
riages in accordance with their own cus-
toms and traditions, while separation and divorce only can be granted 
by the county governor or by the court. The discrepancy in the status 
of religious marriage and divorce can lead to complicated situations 
in court. Such situations, in turn, offer insight into the possibilities 
and limitations of “legal pluralism.” The case at hand revolves around 
Ahmed and Laila (pseudonyms), both of whom are Muslims with an 
Arab background. Each is also middle-aged and had been married be-
fore. Laila has adult children from a previous marriage, one of whom 
lives in Norway. After a short marriage to Ahmed, Laila filed for divorce 
in Norway. In this way, she received permanent residence in Norway 
and could continue to live with her daughter. She could even remarry 
her first husband if she pleased. Ahmed on the other hand seemed to 
have gained little from his marriage with Laila. His subsequent actions 
revealed that he felt deeply humiliated by the whole situation. As the 
parties solemnized their marriage in a mosque in Norway, he may mis-
takenly have expected that Norwegian law allowed for Islamic divorce 
procedures as well. This may well be the reason why Ahmed started a 
court case in defence of his “honour,” expecting justice from the Nor-
wegian Court. One could also assume that Ahmed did not want to pay 
alimony to Laila, but as the couple did not have children together this 
point is moot. 
The male perspective
After many rounds in court, Ahmed, who had permanent residence in 
Norway, appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that “his marriage to 
Laila was invalid since she never seriously intended to marry him.”3 He 
meant that she contracted a marriage of conven-
ience (pro forma) in order to obtain legal residence 
in Norway. He also questioned the authenticity of 
Laila’s divorce papers, implying that she had com-
mitted polyandry, a serious crime both in Norway 
and her country of origin. Ahmed concluded that 
the case had “important legal and social compli-
cations for him personally and that he risked the 
death penalty or at best life-long imprisonment, 
in those countries that apply Sharia (Islamic law) 
such as the country in which his family is cur-
rently living.” Ahmed obviously attempted to gain 
sympathy and support for his case by invoking a 
media discourse that presents Sharia in its most 
extreme forms. 
The Supreme Court agreed with Ahmed that 
the case involved the material invalidity of the 
marriage and not a divorce or dissolution as in § 
24 of the Marriage Act, as the High Court of Ap-
peal mistakenly had assumed. The Supreme Court 
thus dissolved the judgement and returned the 
case to the High Court of Appeal. In May 2003 a 
new round started up, during which Ahmed presented new informa-
tion and documentation. He explained that Laila and her first husband 
Khalid have a daughter in Norway who had moved there several years 
earlier after marrying a Norwegian 
Muslim citizen. He suggested that this 
might have been the reason why they 
had both earlier applied for residence 
in Norway. 
He also revealed some details about 
the context of his marriage. In 1999 he 
had first met Khalid and told him about 
his wish to remarry a woman who al-
ready had children. Afterwards Khalid 
had contacted his wife and they had 
agreed upon a divorce in order for her to marry Ahmed. Laila’s brother 
had represented her husband at the local Sharia court and all parties 
had agreed. Ahmed called the whole procedure a “farce” and intimated 
that the divorce was to be understood as mukhala‘a, not talaq.4 He also 
meant that a divorce should be initiated by men in order “to be accept-
able by Islamic Law.” This opinion is also generally supported by Islamic 
countries that do not recognize Norwegian divorces when they are ini-
tiated by Muslim women without the approval of their husband. 
Ahmed also questioned the legitimacy of the divorce for the follow-
ing reasons: Firstly, Laila already had her foreign divorce approved in 
Norway before she met Ahmed, meaning that she already may have 
had plans to remarry in Norway. Secondly, the authorized translation 
was dated two weeks earlier than the original divorce papers. Thirdly, 
Ahmed presented the Court a certificate from the local Arab register of 
population which confirmed Khalid’s civil status as still being married. 
Ahmed further claimed that he and Laila never actually lived togeth-
er and that “she was always covered and seemed unwilling to fulfil her 
marital duties.” As a result of the marriage and the following divorce 
Ahmed felt deeply humiliated and concluded once more by express-
ing his fear of prosecution (“stoning or even worse”) the next time he 
visited his family. In classical Islamic law the concepts of adultery are 
a part of criminal law and are regulated by the hadd punishments. As 
these punishments are generally more severe they also require a more 
rigorous standard of proof. Since this standard is difficult to meet, the 
normal practice is to apply milder punishments, such as imprisonment, 
lashes, or a fine.5 Ahmed’s fear of prosecution thus seemed exagger-
ated.
The female perspective
Laila did not contest that her marriage with Ahmed may have been 
pro forma, but considered this irrelevant, as it had been dissolved al-
ready. Neither did she contest that Ahmed would have committed 
adultery (zina) if he married an already married woman. “This would 
be the case whether they had had sexual relations or not,” she said, 
“Because if they were married everyone would believe that they had 
had sexual relations.” Both parties agreed that according to the formal 
Sharia law of their country of origin, a marriage had to be consummat-
ed in order for it to be valid. At the same time, Laila appealed to Nor-
wegian law, which does not require the consummation of a marriage 
for it to be regarded as legitimate. She asserted that, “there would be 
many illegal marriages in Norway if marriages without sexual relations 
were invalid.” Laila thus attempted to strengthen her own position by 
appealing to a broad spectre of social, cultural, and religious conven-
tions. As the marriage was contracted in Norway the issue of consum-
mation did not carry any formal weight, but was still deemed of some 
importance by both parties. 
During the court sessions Laila rejected Ahmed’s fear of prosecu-
tion as being unsubstantiated. She presented a letter from the Nor-
wegian Embassy which explained the workings of her kind of divorce 
(mukhala‘a), i.e. one that is based on mutual agreement. “The fact that 
she initiated the divorce at a Sharia court did not mean that her former 
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did it respect the different social, cultural, and religious norms and values 
that both parties clearly expressed? How did the Court meet the different 
expectations of justice as illustrated by the example of Ahmed and Laila 
and did it meet these different feelings of justice with tolerance? 
A plea for openness and knowledge
The court-case described above shows the com-
plexity of cases with an international dimension 
as they arise before domestic courts. Such cases 
require more knowledge and openness from Nor-
wegian judges in relation to other cultures and a 
willingness to cross the borders of their national 
law. In a global world, it is no longer possible to 
see national law as an isolated unity. Its internal 
sovereignty is continuously challenged by ex-
ternal factors, like European law, human rights, 
or religious law that are not bound by national 
borders. These developments challenge the tra-
ditional studies of law that are used to think in 
terms like “rules of law,” “validity,” and “principles 
of law,” while discourses like “conflict,” “process,” 
“function,” and “group” are considered irrelevant.
Today, Norwegian courts face the complications 
of a multicultural society where certain “groups” 
have their own ideas and norms. Such “groups” 
can be a nation, an ethnic group, or a subculture.7 
Norwegian Private International Law allows judg-
es to apply foreign law when a case has a stronger 
connection to another country, thus opening up 
possibilities for legal pluralism. Still, Norwegian 
judges continue to strictly arbitrate according to 
Norwegian rules of law, without paying heed to 
the underlying ideas, norms, and values that exist 
in certain groups from different cultures. This may 
be due to lack of awareness about the existence 
of different perceptions of justice. It may also be 
caused by the lack of knowledge about different 
law cultures or simply a way to protect their na-
tional culture of law. 
husband could not have pronounced a 
talaq earlier in order to free himself from 
her,” Laila added. It is indeed not unusual 
in Islamic countries for Muslim women to 
seek judicial divorce in order to receive a 
divorce registration. Some men deliber-
ately fail to register talaq at the local au-
thorities in order to escape the obligation 
to pay alimony.6 
Laila admitted that the translation may 
have been incorrect, but claimed that the 
divorce papers were originals. “The fact that 
a year after the divorce her former husband 
[Khalid] still was registered as married by 
the local authorities does not prove any-
thing because it is unclear when this infor-
mation was received,” Laila asserted. 
Laila consistently emphasized the dif-
ference between “pro forma” and “forced" 
marriages, invoking a discourse that is often 
staged on the political level with the goal 
to limit further immigration. Laila explained 
that it is possible to contract arranged mar-
riages in Norway as long as they are not es-
tablished under coercion. “As a rule, these 
marriages also function well and if not, 
both parts can file for separation and later 
divorce in accordance with Norwegian law,” 
she added, possibly referring to herself. 
Additionally, Laila presented the Court a letter by a mother’s shelter 
which confirmed that she had come to it asking for help when in a poor 
physical and mental shape. Ahmed had treated her badly, she argued, 
and this had been the main reason why she had left their marital home. 
Indeed, Laila suggested that this court case was just another brick in 
his game to harass her and her family. 
Final judgement of the Court
The High Court of Appeal explained in its judgement that, according 
to the Marriage Act and its later amendments, marriages can be an-
nulled only when coercion and severe abuse of the institution of mar-
riage are involved. Even if Laila had only married Ahmed to improve her 
immigration status, this would not be sufficient to nullify the marriage, 
according to the Court.
Norwegian law allows all parties to freely provide evidence to sup-
port their cases. Eventually, the Court decides which arguments have 
most evidential force. In this case the Court relied, not surprisingly, 
heavily on the documentation provided by the Norwegian Embassy. 
The documentation provided by the Muslim authorities (population 
register) was not given any weight. The Court, furthermore, confirmed 
that consummation is not a marriage condition in Norwegian law and 
that disappointment about unfulfilled expectations in this sense is not 
a reason to declare the marriage void. 
Overall the Court seemed to be more on the side of the female party, 
considering her the weaker part. The Court continuously argued out of 
Norwegian perceptions of justice and Norwegian customs rather than 
observing the underlying conflict between the parties, or trying to find 
solutions that could meet the expectations of all parties involved. The 
Court did not deny that Ahmed could be exposed to prosecution, but 
did not find this fact, of itself, a sufficient reason to declare the mar-
riage invalid. Ahmed thus did not succeed in his petition to annul the 
marriage and he was ordered to cover all legal costs both for himself 
and Laila. Ahmed appealed the decision one final time to the Supreme 
Court, but his appeal was rejected. 
The question pertaining to the nature of Ahmed’s motive to go to 
court and risk such financial losses cannot be answered with full cer-
tainty. Was it out of “revenge” or was it in expectation of receiving com-
pensation for his loss of social status both in Norway and in the tran-
snational context? Did he feel betrayed by Laila who had divorced him 
after such a short period of marriage? As Norwegian law does not allow 
women to claim alimony in cases where they do not have children to-
gether, this issue did not play a role here. 
The case also raises other and more important questions. Did the Court 
actually observe the notion of legal pluralism that came to the surface and 
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